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Abstract: In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant 
standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a 
potential risk to be subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on 
Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of 
the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal’s finding regarding the victim status of the 
applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. The note further 
concludes that the Tribunal’s finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its 
engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked 
depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of Human Rights Watch and the case law 
on extraterritoriality more generally against the backdrop of the place of principled 
reasoning in human rights adjudication. 
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A    INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever made a phone call, sent an email, or, you know, used 
the internet [sic]? Of course you have! 
                                                
* PhD Candidate, Faculty of Laws, University College London. I am grateful to Joe Atkinson, 
Raquel Barradas de Freitas, Alex Green, Colm O’Cinneide, Eugenio Velasco and two anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Responsibility for the views expressed, of course, 
remains mine alone. 
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Chances are, at some point, your communications were swept up by 
the U.S. National Security Agency’s [NSA] mass surveillance 
program and passed on to Britain’s intelligence agency GCHQ 
[Government Communications Headquarter].1 
These are the first lines of an entry on the website of the Privacy International 
Campaign.2 It was set up by the charity so that individuals could apply to the UK 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s (IPT or Tribunal) to find out if they had been subject 
to unlawful surveillance. The IPT is a court that adjudicates complaints about secret 
surveillance by public authorities, either because the measures are unlawful or 
because they are in breach of human rights. The aforementioned campaign led to 663 
complaints by NGOs and individuals both from within and from outside the UK. In 
Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office3 
(Human Rights Watch) the IPT considers two preliminary issues related to these 
complaints: standing and the extraterritorial application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention). The Tribunal decided that all applicants 
have standing provided they supply further information. But it also found, 
problematically, that the ECHR was not applicable to individuals abroad even if they 
have been subject to government surveillance. 
Who should be considered to have standing in a claim regarding the violation of 
privacy by alleged government surveillance is a difficult issue due to the measure’s 
necessary secrecy. Surveillance for the purposes of gaining intelligence is only 
effective if it is unknown to the target. If a targeted individual knows that their 
communications are being monitored, they may adapt their behaviour and thus distort 
any intelligence gathered. The legal flipside is that individuals must be able to 
complain about covert surveillance even if they cannot prove that they are subject to 
such a measure. Demanding that applicants show that they meet the usual ECHR 
standard of being ‘directly affected’ would render judicial oversight impossible by 
definition.4 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) and also the IPT 
in Human Rights Watch discuss the standard under the heading of ‘victim status’. 
                                                
1 Human Rights Watch and others v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and others [2016] UKIPTrib 15_165-CH  at [7]. 
2 The campaign has since been suspended. See https://www.privacyinternational.org/illegalspying 
(last accessed 23 August 2016). 
3 n 1 above. 
4 Zhakarov v Russia (2016) 63 EHRR 17. 
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‘Extraterritoriality’ or ‘extraterritorial application’ denotes the issue of whether the 
ECHR applies to individuals abroad. In essence, the question is if and when states 
owe human rights obligations to individuals outside their territory.5 Following the 
wording of the Convention the discussion turns on the interpretation of the term 
‘jurisdiction’. The IPT thus frames the question as follows: is a person brought within 
UK jurisdiction when they are subjected to surveillance by the UK Government even 
though they are not within UK territory and not directly under the control of the UK? 
This is a thorny issue in the context of privacy. Digital communications do not respect 
national borders and neither does government surveillance of such communications. It 
is thus difficult to make a case that someone’s location should make a difference to 
whether or not they are owed respect for their private life according to article 8 ECHR. 
Questions on victim status and extraterritoriality arise regularly in the context of 
rights to privacy and mass surveillance. Accordingly, a pronouncement of a 
specialised tribunal on these issues is bound to have profound impact. In addition, 
Human Rights Watch is, as far as the author is aware, the first time that a UK court 
has ruled on the applicability of the ECHR regarding government surveillance abroad 
and thus represents a major development in the area. An Investigatory Powers Bill 
that increases powers to intercept and retain data in bulk6 means that these issues are 
as relevant and topical as they could be, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. 
The findings in Human Rights Watch are controversial and have swiftly been 
criticised by commentators.7 As the Tribunal’s rulings are not subject to direct appeal 
in the UK it is highly likely that its decision will be challenged before the ECtHR.8 
This note argues that the IPT’s finding regarding the victim status of the applicants 
is largely (but not fully) correct when considered against the ECHR, but that the same 
                                                
5  M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and 
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) 8. 
6 At the time of drafting the latest available document was Investigatory Powers HL Bill (2016-
2017) 62. A problematic example in terms of bulk data interception and retention is section 84, which 
provides for Internet connection data to be retained in bulk and accessible to government agencies 
without a warrant. In addition, parts 6 and 7 of the Bill introduce potentially extensive bulk warrants.  
7 M. Milanovic, ‘UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal Rules that Non-UK Residents Have No Right 
to Privacy under the ECHR’ EJIL:Talk! 18 May 2016 at http://www.ejiltalk.org/uk-investigatory-
powers-tribunal-rules-that-non-uk-residents-have-no-right-to-privacy-under-the-echr/ (last accessed 23 
August 2016); S. Kim ‘ECHR Jurisdiction and Mass Surveillance: Scrutinising the UK Investigatory 
Power Tribunal’s Recent Ruling’ EJIL:Talk!, 9 June 2016 at http://www.ejiltalk.org/echr-jurisdiction-
and-mass-surveillance-scrutinising-the-uk-investigatory-power-tribunals-recent-ruling/ (last accessed 
23 August 2016). 
8 Kim n 7 above. 
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cannot be said for its finding regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
judgment as a whole raises serious questions concerning the place of principled 
reasoning in human rights adjudication and in the on-going debate about the frontiers 
of human rights. The note begins with a sketch of the facts and the background of the 
case. In its second and third parts, it addresses the Tribunal’s reasoning and findings 
relating to victim status and extraterritoriality with regard to the case law of the 
ECtHR. The fourth part considers a deeper question: why did the Tribunal fail as it 
did? To answer this, the note explores the place of principled reasoning in human 
rights adjudication both before the ECtHR and in the domestic context. 
A    BACKGROUND 
The IPT considers two kinds of applications. The first kind are claims under section 7 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) as set out by section 65(2)(a) of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000). With regard to these 
claims the IPT is required to act according to section 2 of the HRA 1998 and thus to 
‘take into account’ ECtHR decisions and judgments. The second kind of applications 
is complaints against secret measures regulated by RIPA 2000. These are domestic 
law complaints according to section 65(2)(b) of RIPA 2000 against conduct of public 
authorities, such as intelligence services. Individuals can complain about any alleged 
failure to act lawfully or to follow internal procedure by such public authorities. 
After the Snowden revelations in 2013, several non-governmental organisations, 
including Privacy International, applied to the IPT in order to challenge the UK 
Government’s surveillance regime concerning bulk data interception. 9  They 
challenged that UK intelligence services had access to data collected by the NSA 
under PRISM, which provided for the collection of data from companies such as 
Yahoo and Google,10 and a bundle of programmes referred to as Upstream, under 
which data was intercepted from fibre optic cables.11 Further, they challenged a UK 
programme called Tempora, under which the GCHQ intercepted data from cables 
landing in the UK.12 Liberty/Privacy No 2 found that the arrangements of intelligence 
                                                
9 n 1 above at [3]. See further ibid. 
10 M. Rispoli, ‘Looking at PRISM’, 7 June 2013 https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/267 
(last accessed 23 August 2016). 
11 Kim n 7 above. 
12 n 1 above at [3]. On Tempora see E. MacAskill and others, ‘GCHQ Taps Fibre-optic Cables for 
Secret Access to World’s Communication’ The Guardian 21 June 2013.  
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sharing under PRISM and Upstream were unlawful and contravened article 8 ECHR 
prior to the disclosures in the same judgments.13 Liberty/Privacy No 3 found that 
Tempora, the system operated pursuant to section 8(4) of RIPA 2000 warrants, was 
legal and complied with the ECHR.14 
After these findings were published, Privacy International launched the campaign 
mentioned above. 663 applications were made through the campaign webpage, each 
of which contained both a human rights claim and a domestic law complaint.15 They 
asserted that the applicants believed to be affected by either information sharing 
according to PRISM and Upstream and/or by Tempora and challenged the lawfulness 
of these measures under the ECHR or RIPA 2000 and internal procedures 
respectively. 16  The judgment in Human Rights Watch followed a request of the 
Respondents to dismiss all applications based on the fact that the proceedings in 
Liberty/Privacy had resolved any future applications (including the ones before the 
Tribunal now) on the same issues.17 It dealt with the first ten of the applications in 
order to determine if any of them and the remaining ones should be considered.18 As 
such the Tribunal’s determinations are on the preliminary issues of victim status or 
locus standi and the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ECHR.19 
The IPT held that the complaints were not res judicata as a refusal to look at each 
claim separately would be contrary to ECtHR case law and the Tribunal’s duties 
according to RIPA 2000. The IPT found that such a refusal would undermine its own 
function of judicial oversight.20 Consequently, the Tribunal determined that it will 
consider all domestic law complaints pursuant to section 65(2)(b) of RIPA 2000 so 
long as the claimants submit further information to demonstrate that they are 
potentially at risk of surveillance. 21  Importantly, complaints will be considered 
regardless of whether the applicant in question was at any material time present in the 
UK or not.22 With regard to the human rights claims according to section 65(2)(a) of 
RIPA 2000, however, the IPT decided to only consider those made by persons 
                                                
13 Kim n 7 above. 
14 ibid. 
15 n 1 above at [8]-[9]. 
16 ibid at [8]-[10], [24]. 
17 ibid at [28]-[29]. 
18 ibid at [11]-[12]. 
19 ibid at [13]. 
20 ibid at [41]. 
21 ibid at [46]-[48]. 
22 ibid at [64]. 
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situated in the UK because claimants who ‘do not enjoy a private life in the UK’ do 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the UK according to article 1 of the ECHR.23 This is 
where the difference between the two kinds of applications gains traction. 
A    VICTIM STATUS 
The first substantive part of the judgment deals with what the Tribunal calls the victim 
issue.24 The IPT found that for the purposes of both domestic law complaints and 
human rights claims all applicants have standing if they provide further information 
explaining why, due to their personal situation, they are potentially at risk of 
surveillance under the relevant legislation.25  This section discusses the Tribunal’s 
engagement with the ECtHR case law and the IPT’s own reasoning. It argues that the 
Tribunal’s conclusion is sound, but that its reasoning is not. 
The IPT first outlines the relevant case law of the ECtHR in considerable detail.26 
The usual standard for the latter to consider an application is that an applicant be 
‘directly effected’ by the alleged interference with a Convention right.27 This is what 
it means for an applicant to be a victim of a rights violation according to article 34 of 
the ECHR. The Court justifies this by taking recourse to the Convention’s and – 
following from this – its own function: ‘…the Convention does not provide for the 
institution of an actio popularis and … its [the Court’s] task is not normally to review 
the relevant law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in 
which they were applied to, or affected, the applicant gave rise to a violation of the 
Convention…’.28 However, the ECtHR has allowed for a nuanced approach whenever 
covert measures were at issue. It has, in its own words ‘… permitted general 
challenges to the relevant legislative regime in the sphere of secret surveillance in 
recognition of the particular features of secret surveillance measures and the 
importance of ensuring effective control and supervision of them.’29  
In Zhakarov the Court ‘harmonised’ its approach to the conditions in which an 
applicant can claim to be a victim of a violation of article 8 of the ECHR without 
                                                
23 ibid at [58], [61]-[64]. 
24 ibid at [14]-[48]. 
25 ibid at [46]-[48]. 
26 ibid at [14]-[19]. The Tribunal does not distinguish between domestic law complaints and human 
rights claims. 
27 See, eg, Klass v Germany Series A No 28 at [36]-[38]; Burden v United Kingdom (2008) 47 
EHRR 38 at [33]. 
28 n 4 above at [164]. 
29 ibid at [165]. See also n 1 above at [16]. 
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having to prove that they had actually been subject to surveillance by introducing a 
two-tiered test regarding abstract complaints.30 First, it needs to be established that 
laws and practices instituting secret surveillance indeed exist. Their existence is 
sufficient cause to make an application to the Court for all those to whom such 
measures might be applied without the need to show any risk of actual surveillance.31 
An applicant need only establish that they belong to a class of persons that could be 
subjected to surveillance under the framework.32 This is the relevant standard for 
cases where there is no effective remedy against secret surveillance measures at the 
domestic level.33 Second, the Court held that an applicant must show – in addition to 
the existence of practices of secret surveillance – that the applicant is ‘potentially at 
risk’ that intelligence services have compiled information concerning their private 
life.34 This is the standard that the Court uses in cases where there is an effective 
domestic remedy. The latter standard can be classified as a mixed approach: it does 
allow for abstract challenges but requires applicants to show not only that the 
legislation might apply to them but that there is a potential risk of actual surveillance. 
In sum, the Court continues to allow abstract challenges of secret surveillance 
measures but differentiates what applicants have to establish according to whether 
there are effective domestic remedies available. 
This harmonised approach is in line with the justification for allowing abstract 
challenges in cases involving secret surveillance, which was made explicit in Kennedy 
v UK.35 The ECtHR named as the main reason for allowing abstract challenges in 
surveillance cases that ‘… secrecy of such measures does not result in the measures 
being effectively unchallengeable and outside the supervision of national judicial 
authorities and the Court.’36 It thus appealed to the principle of effective oversight 
described above. The ECtHR then went on to consider whether there was judicial 
oversight available on the national level. Kennedy was a case lodged against the UK 
and the Court found that the higher standard of proof was applicable because of the 
                                                
30 n 4 above at [170]-[172]. 
31 ibid at [171]. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 n 4 above at [166]. 
35 (2011) 52 EHRR 4 at [124]. See also n 4 above at [169]. 
36 ibid at [124]. 
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existence of the very Tribunal discussed here.37 In Zhakarov, the Court held explicitly 
that the mixed approach where applicants need to show that they are ‘potentially at 
risk’ of surveillance is the relevant standard only where there are effective domestic 
remedies. 38  Wherever this is not the case applicants only need to show that the 
relevant law and practices might apply to them.39 
The IPT made clear at the outset that it is of an open mind regarding the standard 
of proof required, and inspired by the case law of the ECtHR.40  The Tribunal’s 
conclusion is that it should follow the ECtHR and adopt the standard developed in 
Kennedy. 41  It does so by extensively quoting Zhakarov and then concluding that 
‘accordingly’ the same reasoning applies to proceedings before the IPT. There are two 
issues with the IPT’s approach. First, the ECtHR’s reasoning does not say anything 
about the standard a domestic court should apply but only refers to the situation the 
ECtHR finds itself in. This means that the IPT should have resorted to its own 
principled reasoning. Second, if the Tribunal had actually followed the ECtHR’s 
reasoning it should have come to a different conclusion. The IPT should have 
concluded that the applicants could challenge the legislative framework as such 
without showing a potential risk of surveillance because the IPT itself is a court of 
first instance and cannot rely on the existence of remedies to justify higher standards 
of access. As mentioned, the ECtHR in Kennedy allowed for the mixed standard 
requiring the applicant to show a ‘potential risk’ of surveillance precisely because the 
UK has a judicial mechanism in the form of the IPT.42 The harmonised approach in 
Zhakarov explicitly confirms this rationale.43 If the IPT now adopts the (slightly) 
higher hurdle involving ‘potential risk’ of surveillance as opposed to the more 
generous standard of an actual abstract challenge of the legal framework to access the 
very procedures that gave rise to its justification in the first place, the purpose of the 
‘potential risk’ version of the victim status is defeated. 
None of this is to say that access to the IPT is not an effective domestic remedy, 
nor that the Tribunal’s conclusion is unsound. It is to say, however, that the Tribunal 
                                                
37 n 35 above at [185]-[190]. The IPT makes explicit reference to this fact: n 1 above at [17]. 
38 n 4 above at [171]. 
39 ibid. 
40 n 1 above at [14]. 
41 ibid at [19]. 
42 n 35 above at [125]-[129]. 
43 n 4 above at [171]. 
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should have carried out its own principled reasoning. For example, it could have 
pointed to a principle of integrity of the judicial process. That is, the IPT could have 
said that as a specialised tribunal whose judgments are not liable to judicial review it 
is ill equipped to consider abstract challenges even if the ECtHR’s reasoning required 
them. Insofar as the Tribunal did not do so, Human Rights Watch is a missed 
opportunity. However, compared to the problems the Tribunal faces in its dealing 
with the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this can only be described as a minor 
quibble. 
A    EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Noting that two of the six individuals whose claims were under consideration have 
never resided in the UK the Tribunal turned to extraterritoriality.44 The IPT found that 
while all domestic law complaints would be considered, only the human rights claims 
of those individuals who were within the UK would be.45 This section puts the issue 
of extraterritoriality into context where necessary and analyses the IPT’s reasoning on 
the question. It argues that the Tribunal did not deal with the issue of 
extraterritoriality in a satisfactory way, dodging rather than resolving the question 
before it. 
Article 1 of the ECHR provides that states ‘… shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of this Convention’. It is 
this provision that has led the ECtHR to address extraterritoriality in the interpretation 
of the term jurisdiction. The provision refers to the jurisdiction of a state, not the 
jurisdiction of a court.46 In addition, the term jurisdiction has a particular meaning in 
international human rights law. It denotes a threshold criterion for the application of a 
particular human rights treaty and should not be confused with other meanings of 
jurisdiction in international law.47 Accordingly, it is inaccurate or at least confusing to 
say – as the Tribunal does – that the result of its analysis of the ECtHR’s case law on 
the extraterritorial application of the Convention is that the IPT lacks jurisdiction.48 It 
would have been more helpful and also correct to say that the Convention is not 
                                                
44 n 1 above at [49]-[63]. 
45 ibid at [60]-[62]. 
46 n 5 above19-20. 
47 n 5 above 19-41; see also S. Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts To’ (2012) 
25 LJIL 857, 862-864. 
48 n 1 above at [62]. 
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applicable because the claimants are not within the jurisdiction of the UK and that 
they thus do not have a claim in the first place. The correct question is whether the 
UK owes individuals abroad obligations arising form the Convention or not.49 The 
fact that (in the view of the Tribunal) the UK does not owe such obligations is the 
reason why the IPT dismisses the claims and the fact that it sees itself as not having 
jurisdiction is parasitic upon this former conclusion. Using the term ‘jurisdiction’ in 
different senses without clarifying this is unhelpful and should have been avoided. 
Turning to the IPT’s substantive finding on jurisdiction it is useful to begin with a 
brief overview of the ECtHR’s case law on extraterritoriality to date. The Court starts 
from the assumption that there is a ‘territorial principle’, that is, it deems jurisdiction 
to be primarily exercised on national territory.50 In the cases following Banković  v 
Belgium (Banković), 51 the ECtHR developed what it calls exceptions to this principle. 
This is how it arrived at the statement in Al-Skeini v UK where it found that there are 
two exceptions to the principle: the personal one and the spatial one.52 The personal 
model of extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to a situation where state agents exercise 
physical power or control over a person abroad. The scenario used as the usual 
backdrop is arrest or detention. 53  In Al-Skeini, which among other situations 
concerned the killing of civilians during patrols, the Court further specified that the 
state must exercise some or all public powers usually exercised by government.54 The 
spatial model, on the other hand, refers to a situation where a state has effective 
control over an area outside its territory as a result of military action, usually 
belligerent occupation.55 Most recently, the Court seems to have abandoned a strict 
distinction between the personal and the spatial model and instead focuses on what 
kind of power and control was being exercised in order to establish jurisdiction.56 The 
ECtHR reached these current principles by way of a rather mysterious journey, using 
slightly different definitions of jurisdiction at different times, usually without 
                                                
49 Noted correctly by the Respondents, paraphrased ibid, at [49] and the Tribunal ibid at [52]. 
50 Banković  v Belgium (2007) 44 EHRR SE5 at [59]; Al-Skeini v UK (2011) EHRR 18 at [132]. 
51 Banković  v Belgium n 42 above. 
52 n 42 above at [133]-[139]. 
53 Al-Skeini n 50 above at [133]-[136]. See also Hassan v UK ECtHR 16 Sep 2014. 
54 n 49 above at [138]. 
55 ibid at [135]. 
56 Jaloud v Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 29; see also L. Raible, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the 
Echr: Why Jaloud and Pisari Should Be Read as Game Changers’ (2016) EHRLR 161. 
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justification and occasionally contradicting itself.57 It is especially striking that the 
Court has been unwilling to rely explicitly on the values underpinning the principles it 
developed.58  
The above summary points to two important facts. First, the ECtHR has not yet 
decided a case regarding article 8 of the Convention and mass surveillance abroad. 
Second, and perhaps as a result of the first point, the exceptions the Court currently 
operates with do not easily lend themselves to guide the application of the ECHR in 
cases where a state subjects individuals located abroad to surveillance. For example, 
does the interception and storage of information regarding the private life of an 
individual amount to physical power and control of that individual? Or does the 
tapping of cables result in control over an area? Both questions must be answered in 
the negative, albeit with some unease. After all, it seems to make little difference to 
the individual who is subjected to surveillance if their information is intercepted and 
processed by a state where one happens to reside or by some other state.59 A moral 
distinction between these two cases is implausible, particularly if states that practice 
surveillance share information.60 
Additionally, when the Tribunal’s finding is thought through the result is as 
follows: the right to the protection of one’s private and family life would be virtually 
inapplicable to electronic communications. The reason is that there is only ever one 
state party to the ECHR that would owe individuals obligations under the Convention 
while all others – all the states one does not reside in – could subject any individual 
abroad to unfettered surveillance. It is unsurprising that the IPT found that the UK did 
not have jurisdiction over individuals abroad simply because it may have intercepted 
their information,61 if only because the ECtHR case law is inconclusive at best.62 But 
the result is deeply disturbing. 
Regarding the cases decided by the ECtHR that the Tribunal chose to analyse 
there is one particularly questionable move. The IPT cites Chagos Islanders v UK63 as 
the most recent authoritative statement of the principles on authority and jurisdiction 
                                                
57 See the examples in Al-Skeini v UK n 50 above, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bonello at [5]. 
58 See below 15-17. 
59 See also M. Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in a Digital 
Age’ (2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81-146, 118-19. 
60 See further ibid 123-24.  
61 Milanovic n 7 above. 
62 n 1 above at [61]. 
63 (2013) 56 EHRR SE15. 
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abroad and quotes the relevant passages.64 This is not entirely accurate, however. In 
Chagos Islanders the Court did not ultimately decide admissibility based on the issue 
of jurisdiction,65 which makes the cited passages an obiter dictum. Where the ECtHR 
did deal with extraterritoriality it addressed a rather niche aspect: the difference 
between articles 1 and 56 of the ECHR. The latter is a provision rooted in Europe’s 
colonial history and stipulates that the Convention only applies to territories for the 
international relations of which a state is responsible on a permanent basis – in other 
words colonial territories –– if the contracting state makes a declaration to that effect. 
Furthermore, throughout its treatment of the issue of jurisdiction, the Court relies on 
Al-Skeini, just as it does in other judgments on extraterritoriality.66 This confirms that 
the latter remains the authoritative summary of the ECtHR’s views on jurisdiction and 
that Chagos Islanders has not changed this. 67  The IPT’s choice to represent the 
ECtHR’s case law based on a truncated version employed in Chagos Islanders rather 
than the more comprehensive and also decisive list in Al-Skeini is thus questionable. 
All the same, but not reflecting well on the IPT either, this choice does not seem to 
have impacted the Tribunal’s reasoning. 
A further problematic aspect of the IPT’s judgment is the way it engages with 
Banković  v Belgium. The IPT only mentions it once with a gesture at the fact that the 
analogy to the present case was close,68 which is a little cryptic.69 In Human Rights 
Watch the issue is whether a person potentially subjected to surveillance is within the 
jurisdiction of the UK when the UK’s agents intercept and store data on UK territory 
even though the person whose data is concerned is not within that territory. In 
Banković  the ECtHR had to consider if the same is the case for civilians killed in a 
bombing by the respondent states of a television station in Belgrade. How these two 
scenarios are similar would need to be established. Unfortunately, the Tribunal does 
no such thing and thus bases its findings on not very much reasoning at all. 
There are more complaints to be made with regard to the reasoning of the Tribunal 
in the few paragraphs that deal with jurisdiction. And the criticisms that the present 
                                                
64 n 1 above at [53], the name of the case is misquoted as ‘Chagos Island v UK’. 
65 n 63 above at [75]-[76]. 
66 See, eg, n 53 above at [74]; n 56 above at [139]. 
67 n 56 above163. 
68 n 1 above at [58]. 
69 Kim n 7 above. 
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author is aware of are well founded.70 What is clear even after this brief discussion is 
that the Tribunal does not engage in any depth with the ECtHR’s case law on the 
extraterritorial application of the Convention. In order to elucidate what the Tribunal 
should have done in this regard, a closer look at the quality and depth of the ECtHR’s 
reasoning is warranted. The remainder of this note argues that the reason for the 
Tribunal’s failures in Human Rights Watch is a lack of proper engagement with the 
underlying principles at stake. It introduces a framework of understanding principled 
reasoning that illuminates what the IPT – and the ECtHR – should have done. Finally, 
it shows that the quality of the IPT’s engagement with ECtHR case law in Human 
Rights Watch correlates with how principled the ECtHR’s reasoning in a given matter 
is in the first place. 
A    PRINCIPLED REASONING 
The fundamental problem of both parts of Human Rights Watch is the Tribunal’s 
failure to engage properly with the underlying principles. With regard to victim status, 
the IPT considered the ECtHR’s case law carefully and at length but still draws the 
wrong conclusion. In the part of the judgment dealing with extraterritoriality, the IPT 
does not engage with case law of the ECtHR in a similarly meaningful way and 
instead relies on a rather cursory analysis of the relevant cases.71 Conceptualising 
what the Tribunal and – at least as far as extraterritoriality is concerned – the ECtHR 
should have done requires a framework that explains the place of principled reasoning 
in human rights adjudication. To this end, consider the following. 
‘Principled reasoning’ denotes reasoning that relies on principles. Principles, in 
turn, are understood here to mean standards that are observed because they are a 
requirement of justice or of morality more generally.72 Unlike legal rules, principles 
do not necessitate action but only provide one reason among several potential ones 
that points in one direction.73 In addition, it is posited that applying (legal) principles 
requires an enquiry into the values they uphold.74 Together with values, principles so 
                                                
70 Milanovic n 7 above; ibid. 
71 Kim n 7 above. 
72 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth 1977) 22. For a critique of this 
understanding of principles see, eg, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1994) 259-263. 
73 Dworkin n 72 above 24-28. 
74 A. Green, ‘A Philosophical Taxonomy of European Human Rights Law’ (2012) EHRLR 71, 73. 
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underpinned can then be used to justify rules.75 Rules guide action in an all-or-nothing 
fashion; either a rule is applicable and supplies a full answer or it is not and in that 
case does not contribute anything.76 That is, unlike principles rules do not cater to 
considering conflicting issues. Rather, a rule is the result of considering all relevant 
principles and values that might justify it. 
Take the ECtHR’s consideration of the appropriate standard for victim status 
under the Convention. The Court says that it does ‘not normally’ deal with general 
review of legislation.77 This suggests that the Court sees this as a principle that points 
in one direction but can be trumped by more important considerations. Accordingly, 
the ECtHR goes on to outline other, potentially more important, principles that could 
point in another direction in cases where secret measures are the subject of an 
application. In the case of secret surveillance, the principle of effective oversight is 
found to be the more important principle on balance.78 
The ECtHR does not appeal to a relationship between rule and exceptions. On the 
contrary, it seems aware of the different considerations that point in different 
directions and outlines them in this fashion. On the one hand, there is the principle 
that the Court adjudicates individual complaints based on concrete grievances. On the 
other hand, there is the principle that the ECtHR should ensure effective oversight 
when it comes to secret surveillance because the latter poses a threat to the right to 
protection of private life in article 8 of the ECHR. Put differently, the Court engages 
in principled reasoning about the victim status in secret surveillance cases. The 
ECtHR reaches its conclusions on how an individual needs to be affected by a 
particular system or measure by considering different principles that pull in different 
directions. Finally, it infers the rule on what an applicant must show in order to count 
as a victim from these principles. 
The IPT engages with the ECtHR’s case law on victim status in some depth. 
However, the Tribunal does not engage with the reasoning of the ECtHR but only 
with the result. This would explain why it does not grapple with the fact that the 
principles employed by the Court do not actually justify the Tribunal’s conclusions. In 
other words, the IPT does not recognise that a first domestic instance should employ 
                                                
75 ibid 72. 
76 Dworkin n 72 above 24. 
77 n 4 above at [164]. 
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different principles than the ECtHR in order to justify that the applicant must show 
that they are ‘potentially at risk’ that intelligence services have compiled information 
concerning their private life.79 Instead of ignoring this inconvenient state of affairs, 
the Tribunal should have engaged in its own principled reasoning if it wanted to 
justify why this standard is an appropriate rule. 
Turning now to the issue of extraterritoriality, it is again useful to start with an 
analysis of the ECtHR’s reasoning. Green distinguishes between principles and rules 
in order to elucidate that Convention rights are best understood as principles. 80 
However, there is no reason to restrict the use of the distinction as such to the 
interpretation of Convention rights. 81  In fact, the case law dealing with 
extraterritoriality in light of article 1 of the ECHR is an example to the contrary. The 
provision reads and operates like a generalised rule:82 ‘The High Contracting Parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in 
section 1 of this Convention.’ However, because it is a generalisation it still needs to 
be interpreted by recourse to the principles and values that justify it. 
Seemingly aware of the need for further interpretation and thus aiming to duly 
justify the rule, the ECtHR speaks of ‘general principles relevant to jurisdiction’83 
when ascertaining what jurisdiction means. However, the Court does not actually 
operationalize its ‘principles’ as such. The Court starts from the assumption that there 
is a ‘territorial principle’, that is, it deems jurisdiction to be primarily exercised on 
national territory. 84  As described above, the ECtHR has developed what it calls 
‘exceptional circumstances capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction… 
outside territorial boundaries’ 85 . However, framing competing considerations as 
exceptions86 to a principle does not sit easily with the understanding of principles 
adopted here. A principle does not have exceptions, only rules do. 87  Instead, 
                                                
79 See above 8-9. 
80 n 74 above 79-80. 
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(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) 80-98, where he proposes a similar approach to the doctrine of 
the ‘margin of appreciation’ emphasising reasons and principles underlying the ECtHR’s conclusions. 
See also B. Çali, ‘On Interpretivism and International Law’ (2009) 20 EJIL 805 on the relevance of 
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82 cf n 74 above 80. 
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85 Al-Skeini n 50 bove at [132]. 
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principles are requirements of justice or morality more generally that point in one 
direction and have a dimension of weight in the sense that they can be deemed more 
or less important depending on the salience of the underpinning value in a given 
case.88 
Accordingly, the Court should be engaging, for example, with the question why 
the generalised rule in article 1 of the ECHR does not rely on territory and what the 
consequences are for the meaning of jurisdiction. 89  Applying this structure of 
reasoning to the area of extraterritoriality of the right to protection of one’s private life 
should – in the author’s view – take the following form. 90  One of the overarching 
values regarding Convention rights is the equal moral status of each individual.91 Two 
of many principles deriving from equality are worth considering with regard to the 
extraterritorial application of the Convention. First, Convention rights by protecting 
everyone equally both need and bind public authorities that have power over areas of 
human activity because this power allows them to respect equality in the first place.92 
Second, the term jurisdiction (as opposed to territory) should be understood to ensure 
that cases where territory does not make a moral difference are treated alike.93  That is, 
if a state has the same kind of power regardless of whether the victim of a human 
rights violation is within or outside its territory said state should be held to the same 
standards under the ECHR in both situations. 
The next question is what exactly needs to be within the power of public 
institutions. The IPT actually grapples with this question in Human Rights Watch but 
does not go beyond pointing out that the ECtHR has only ruled on power over 
property and that information does not count as such.94 What the Tribunal (and the 
ECtHR, for that matter) does not recognise is that the relevant value here is again 
equality, but that the salient principle needs to relate to articles 1 (jurisdiction) and 8 
(privacy) of the Convention. In conjunction, equality and the right to protection of 
                                                
88 ibid 26-27. 
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one’s private life suggest that it should not make a difference what part of the private 
life is involved or which form of information is at stake. It follows that the power of 
public institutions is relevant regardless of whether it is a power to physically stop and 
search individuals or whether it is to intercept digital communications. Accordingly, 
the IPT should have concluded that individuals whose communications might be 
intercepted by UK authorities are within UK jurisdiction for the purposes of applying 
article 8 of the Convention. 
However, the ECtHR when it has dealt with extraterritoriality in the past has not 
employed any reasoning of this kind. Instead, the Court 
spawned a number of ‘leading’ judgments based on a need-to-decide basis, 
patch-work case law at best. … As the Court has, in these cases, always 
tailored its tenets to sets of specific facts, it is hardly surprising that those 
tenets then seem to limp when applied to sets of different facts.95 
The ECtHR fashions what it calls principles to accommodate specific facts rather than 
asking what values underpin them. Despite the use of the term ‘principle’, the Court’s 
reasoning when it comes to extraterritoriality is not actually principled in the sense 
employed here. This is not to say that all judgments by the ECtHR on this issue 
reached the wrong conclusion. Rather, the complaint is that the structure of the 
reasoning itself is problematic. As will be discussed next, this has significant 
ramifications beyond the case law of the Court. 
The IPT was faced with the following situation when deciding Human Rights 
Watch. The Court had not yet made any pronouncements on a situation of surveillance 
abroad and there are no principles, let alone values, to discern what article 1 of the 
Convention means in different circumstances. This suggests that the admittedly rather 
lacklustre reasoning and findings of the Tribunal do not only turn on the fact that the 
ECtHR has just not yet decided a case concerning extraterritorial mass surveillance. 
Instead, the actual problem is the much deeper one of a lack of principled reasoning.96 
A certain frustration about this state of affairs shows when the IPT states that it cannot 
find that the individuals residing abroad were within the jurisdiction of the UK 
because the ECtHR had failed to clearly decide that they are.97 Given all this, a one-
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issue tribunal such as the IPT can hardly be expected to stand in for the ECtHR when 
it comes to fleshing out underlying principles and values. 
Comparing the case law on extraterritoriality to the cases on victim status renders 
the lack of principled reasoning even more evident. As discussed above, the Court 
looks at article 34 of the ECHR, concluding that it is a principle and that it can be 
trumped by other, more important or salient, principles. That is, the ECtHR considers 
the function of the complaint mechanism and concludes that it is underpinned by at 
least two different principles: the righting of wrongs in case of interferences and that 
the Court should provide effective oversight. Such reasoning gives domestic courts, 
including the IPT, a handle on the matter. They have principles at their disposal and 
can use them to appraise facts, which is exactly what the Tribunal did. The fact that it 
failed to apply them correctly can be criticised but it does not change that the IPT 
engaged meaningfully with the case law.  
Against this background, it seems appropriate to stop and think before attributing 
the Tribunal’s failures to the Tribunal alone. The ECtHR is certainly to blame as 
much for the disappointing outcome regarding extraterritoriality in Human Rights 
Watch. However, criticising either court equally risks remaining meaningless as long 
as we – as commentators – are ourselves unwilling to commit to answering hard 
questions in a principled way. Extraterritoriality is an area where many assumptions 
on human rights law, including the Convention, can no longer be maintained. For 
example, if territory is off the table as a means to identify the bearer of human rights 
obligations, the question becomes: what is valuable about applying human rights and 
what value justifies which part of their application? But this question, or other 
questions like it, rarely figures in commentary on the extraterritorial application of the 
Convention and no amount of criticism of individual judgments by the IPT or the 
ECtHR makes up for this. 
A    CONCLUSION 
The IPT in Human Rights Watch found mostly for the claimants. It held that its 
previous findings did not preclude further proceedings in this case, provided that the 
claimants supply further information, and the Tribunal adopted a generous approach 
to the issue of victim status. While the reasoning on which the IPT’s approach to the 
victim status of the claimants rested was questionable, the result was not. Further, the 
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hope was that the IPT in Human Rights Watch would clarify the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR in cases concerning mass surveillance. However, the 
Tribunal never got around to that; the case law so far delivered by the ECtHR on the 
matter of extraterritoriality never did and still does not allow for it. The underlying 
problem is not that the Tribunal was unwilling to engage with relevant cases but the 
lack of principled reasoning. This is an unhappy state of affairs, not only because the 
wait for the much needed clarification continues, but also because it leaves much to 
be desired in terms of progress in the matter generally speaking.  
 
